Reference

Glossary

Every definition below points back to the platform page that implements it. Nothing here is broader than what that page already claims.

Findings, lifecycle and policy

Finding

One vulnerability, in one package, in one scanned artifact. A finding's identity is derived from its content — never from severity, installed version or report position — so it survives a rescan, a re-rating, or even a change of scanning engine.

Finding lifecycle

The state machine a finding moves through: open, triaged, suppressed, resolved, reopened. Every transition writes to an append-only timeline naming the kind of actor responsible — a person, a scan, a scheduled task, or an API key.

Triage / Triaged

The state a finding enters once someone has read it and accepted it into the backlog, distinct from having decided anything about it yet.

Suppression

A recorded decision to accept a risk, with a required reason, an owner, and an expiry of at most two years. A suppressed finding still appears in every policy verdict as a warning by default — suppressing is not the same as making a finding disappear.

Resolved

The state meaning a scan that would have found this vulnerability did not. Resolution can only be produced by evidence from a rescan — no person can mark a finding resolved by hand.

Reopened

The state recording that a finding was fixed once and came back. It stays permanently distinguishable from a finding that was never fixed, so a regression cannot quietly disappear from the record.

Policy (in TRUSTIVAN)

A declarative, versioned rule set — conditions on severity, finding kind, lifecycle status, fixability, advisory identifier, age and match count, each rule carrying exactly one effect: fail, warn or ignore. There is no embedded expression language and no customer-supplied code to evaluate.

Verdict

The recorded, immutable output of evaluating a policy against a set of findings at a point in time: pass, warn or fail, plus the reasoning behind it. Verdicts are append-only and replayed rather than recomputed on a repeat request.

Fixability

Whether a fixed version of the vulnerable package is available, used as a policy condition — a rule can, for example, fail only on findings that are both critical and fixable.

Container and vulnerability scanning

Container image scanning

Pulling a container image from its registry — public, or private with a stored credential — and analysing its packages for known vulnerabilities. The scanner asks for no Docker socket and no container runtime, and never touches the build host.

SBOM (Software Bill of Materials)

A structured inventory of the packages and components inside a piece of software. TRUSTIVAN both generates an SBOM as a scan output and can accept an already-produced SBOM as its own scan target.

CVE / Advisory

A published vulnerability record (a CVE identifier, or a vendor advisory) that a scanner matches against the packages it finds in an image, a repository or an SBOM.

Repository scanning

Analysing a source repository directly for known vulnerabilities in its declared dependencies, as a scan target alongside container images and SBOMs.

Known-exploited vulnerability

A vulnerability enriched with evidence that it has been observed exploited in the wild, distinct from — and not to be confused with — reachability analysis, which asks whether the vulnerable code path is actually called by your application.

Non-human identity and AI agent security

Non-human identity (NHI)

Any credentialed identity that is not a person: a cloud IAM role, a Kubernetes service account, a CI/CD robot, an API key, or an AI agent acting on a system's behalf. In most estates these outnumber human accounts.

Service account

A non-human identity created for a system or automation to authenticate as, rather than for a person. Kubernetes ServiceAccounts are non-human by construction, which is why TRUSTIVAN's Kubernetes connector can inventory them without guessing.

AI agent (in the NHI sense)

An automated actor whose action against a system TRUSTIVAN NHI Security can authorize at runtime, once that agent already exists in its inventory. NHI Security authorizes agents it has been told about; it does not discover agents on its own.

Runtime authorization (for agents)

The decision — allow, challenge or deny — made when an inventoried AI agent attempts an action, evaluated against declared tool entitlements and runtime rules, and recorded immutably.

Just-in-time (JIT) access

A temporary access grant, bounded at seven days in TRUSTIVAN, where the person requesting it cannot also be the one who approves it.

Quarantine (identity)

A reversible action that restricts what an identity — human-controlled or non-human — can currently do, used when an identity is under investigation without permanently revoking it.

Platform and API

API key / Machine credential

A credential for a caller that is not a person. It is shown once at creation and never readable again, carries a mandatory expiry (a year at most), and has no inherited authority beyond the scopes explicitly granted to it.

Scope (API key scope)

One specific permission grantable to an API key. Certain scopes — minting new keys, managing policies, managing webhooks — cannot be held by any key, regardless of who created it, because a credential able to grant itself more power or rewrite the rules it is graded against defeats the point of scoping.

Idempotency key

A caller-supplied key that reserves a request before any work happens, so two concurrent retries cannot both execute it. A completed request replays its stored response verbatim on a repeat.

Signed cursor

An opaque, signed pagination token used instead of a numeric offset, which is unreliable under concurrent writes. Every paginated response states whether traversal through it is exhaustive.

Webhook

An HTTP callback TRUSTIVAN sends when one of a fixed set of events occurs (scan completion, a verdict, a finding state change), signed with a rotatable secret and announced only from inside the transaction that caused it.

Tenant isolation / Row-level security (RLS)

Database-enforced separation between organizations' data, using PostgreSQL row-level security policies rather than relying on application code to remember to filter every query by tenant.